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DO YOU KNOW how efficient, effec-
tive and inherently safe working prac-
tices are in your organisation? Can you
determine if changes made to the infra-
structure actually achieve the expected
benefits? Can you make predictions to
compare the most optimum change
strategies for your organisation?  If the
answer to any of these questions is no,
then we advise that you read the follow-
ing guidance, which is intended to ex-
plain how organisations can enhance
their most flexible and valuable re-
source: people. We have focussed on the
twin themes of effectiveness and safety,
because we believe that assessment of
human performance has implications
for both.
It is a truism to say that you cannot get
to where you’re going if you don’t know
where you or your intended destination
is. Yet many organisations find them-
selves in this position regarding the peo-
ple part of the system. If you ask a com-
pany where they are and where they will
be at some future point in time in terms
of their technical robustness, most can
tell you. The same cannot be said of their
understanding of human resources. If
companies are not aware of the detail of
the tasks their employees are currently
undertaking, how can they possibly an-
ticipate the future? We think that there
is an implicit assumption that people
will simply fall in with the will of the or-
ganisation, because they are paid to do
so. Yet this is not the case. Little thought
is given to how new technology might be
introduced to the workplace and what
the impact will be upon the working lives
of employees.
In one interview with a seasoned off-
shore driller, he explained that he was
employed from the neck down, i.e., he
wasn’t paid to think. Yet inefficiencies
and incidents are, more often than not,
attributed to people rather than the
technological part of the system. This is
against a background of enormous in-
vestment in equipment and infrastruc-
ture with comparatively little, if any, in-
vestment in the people apart from
salaries and subsistence and, possibly,
some initial training.
There are essentially 3 ways in which or-
ganisations could enhance the resource
that offers them most gains for relative-
ly small expenditure: 
• By investing in learning lessons from
the past;
• By developing a statement of the pres-
ent and;
• By predicting the future.
L E A R N I N G  F R O M  T H E  P A S T
It is said that wise men learn from the
mistakes of others, only fools from their
own. Certainly, past incidents and near
misses provide a wealth of data about
human performance under a variety of
situations that could be harnessed to
improve the effectiveness and safety of
your own organisation. We have found
that outside of major disasters the qual-
ity of these data are poor. In many cases
the data are simply not collected. So
whilst it is possible to recreate the tech-
nical process (e.g., well pressures, mud
weight, etc) it is not possible to identify
what people were saying and doing. The
missing vital ingredients to the assess-
ment of incidents means that, ironically,
we can only learn from major disasters.
Would it not be better to learn from near
misses to help prevent more serious in-
cidents?
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 Plan 11:  Do in order
11.1. Shut well in
Plan 11.1:  Do in order
11.1.1. Initial shut in
Plan 11.1.1:  Do 1 to 6 then 7 if required
11.1.1.1. Stop rotating drillstring
11.1.1.2. Raise drill string to predetermined position
11.1.1.3. Stop pumps
11.1.1.4. Close upper annular
11.1.1.5. Open choke
11.1.1.6. Open kill lines
11.1.1.7. Regulate pressure
11.1.2. Hang off
Plan 11.1.2: Do 1 then (2 if required) then 3 to 10
11.1.2.1. Inform other parties of well status
Plan 11.1.2.1: Do in order
11.1.2.1.1. Contact Toolpusher
11.1.2.1.2. Contact Drilling Supervisor
11.1.2.2. Pressure test kill assembly
11.1.2.3. Set the compensator at mid stroke
11.1.2.4. Close upper pipe rams and regulate
11.1.2.5. Lower the drillstring weight onto the rams
11.1.2.6. Actuate ram locks
11.1.2.7. Increase operating pressure to 1,500 psi
11.1.2.8. Bleed off pressure
11.1.2.9. Open annular
11.1.2.10. Check that pipe rams are not leaking
11.1.3. Measure pressures
Plan 11.1.3:  Do in any order
11.1.3.1. Record SICP
11.1.3.1. Record SIDPP
11.1.3.1. Record Pit Gain
11.1.4. Consult others of well status
Plan 11.1.4:  Do in order
11.1.4.1. Contact Drilling Supervisor and convey pit gain and 
11.1.4.10. Discuss with Drilling Contractor (DST)
…..Continued…
   D=Driller
   T=Toolpusher
   BE=Barge Engineer
   DS=Drilling Supervisor
   NB it is acknowledged that tasks and responsibilities vary slightly from rig to rig
Figure 1: HTA as applied to drilling operations
DEAL WITH KICK
We have used techniques
such as the Sequential
Timed Event Plotting
Procedure (STEPP),
which is an incident
analysis method, to
piece together incidents.
The method distinguish-
es between actions and
communications by peo-
ple, events on the rig,
and the status of the
well. This method is ex-
cellent for drawing a fine
toothcomb through the
sequence of events and
identifying underlying
root causes. Imagine
how much more effective
the process would be if
we weren’t looking over
serious loss, but picking
up on problems before they got too far.
Findings from a recently undertaken
STEPP analysis showed that:
• Some procedures are inadequate and
others had become outdated;
• There were communication difficul-
ties and poor relations between different
parties;
• There were disagreements about di-
agnoses of problems amongst the key
players;
• The lines of authority were unclear;
• There was a lack of relevant training
and poor decision making.
All of these problems can be fixed and
the incident was preventable, but you
have to work out what is wrong first.
T H E  C U R R E N T  P O S I T I O N
Most organisations have a clear sense of
the technology they use and have poli-
cies on capital replacement, yet have lit-
tle idea about how effectively the people
they are employing use this technology
in their working practices. To undertake
such an assessment requires that or-
ganisations develop a clear understand-
ing of the tasks undertaken by the em-
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Task step P C Error mode Description Consequences Recovery
11.1.1.1 L ! A8 Omit to stop drill string 
rotating
Drill string still rotating No Recovery
Equipment 
Damage!
11.1.1.2 L ! A4i Fail to raise drill string high 
enough
Drill string too low Potential major
problem
L ! A4ii Raise drill string too high Drill string too high Potential major
problem
L ! A8 Omit to raise drill string Drill string not raised Potential major
problem
11.1.1.3 L ! A8 Omit to stop pumps Pumps still running No Recovery
Equipment 
Damage
Illustrative remedies
Checklist in prominent position in dog-house (D) Shut-
down panel, containing all necessary switches in 
logical sequence (D)Automation of shut-down 
sequence (D)
Sensor from well showing exact position of drill string 
together with optimum position for dealing with kick on 
display in dog-house (D)
Sensor from well showing exact position of drill string 
together with optimum position for dealing with kick on 
display in dog-house (D)
Sensor from well showing exact position of drill string 
together with optimum position for dealing with kick on 
display in dog-house (D)
Shut-down panel, containing all necessary switches in 
logical sequence (D)Automation of shut down sequence 
(D)
Figure 2: SHERPA applied to drilling operations
P = Probability ( H = high, M = medium, L = low)
C = Criticality (!) (all or none)
ployees and how this fits in with the gen-
eral goals of the company. We have un-
dertaken some studies using a tech-
nique called Hierarchical Task Analysis
(HTA). This approach uses a hierarchy
of goals, to describe the purpose of the
tasks, and identifies individual contri-
butions toward the overall process (Fig-
ure 1).
The technique is invaluable as it re-
moves the ambiguity from complex
processes and enables the organisation
to ask itself why it does things the way it
does. This scrutiny can in itself provide
a useful self-analysis and lead to the
identification of areas for improvement.
HTA has many application areas. For ex-
ample, the description of tasks and goals
can be used to design person specifica-
tions for selection of personnel, to de-
sign training programmes for new per-
sonnel and refresher training for exist-
ing personnel, and to scrutinise the ro-
bustness of working practices for exam-
ining the potential for human error.
This latter aspect of HTA has been em-
bodied in a human error analysis tech-
nique called SHERPA (Systematic Hu-
man Error Reduction and Prediction Ap-
proach). The description of activities de-
veloped using HTA is taken task-by-task
and scrutinised to determine what can
go wrong. SHERPA works rather like a
human HAZOP. Each task is classified
into one of 5 basic types (i.e., checking,
selection, action, information communi-
cation and information retrieval) and
then a taxonomy of error-types applied.
The immediate consequences for system
performance are recorded (Figure 2).
For each error type, an additional as-
sessment of likelihood (how likely the er-
ror is along the ordinal scale of low,
medium and high) and criticality (would
the error be critical in system terms,
where critical is defined as serious loss
in plant, product or personnel) is made.
We have found that it is essential to use
experts in the domain in question when
forming these judgements. Finally po-
tential recovery tasks (i.e., those subse-
quent occasions when the error might be
trapped) and remedial strategies (i.e.
ways of preventing the error, or at least,
minimising the consequences) are iden-
tified. This latter assessment is used as
a focussed way of looking at changes
that could be made in the organisation to
make the working practices more ro-
bust. Remedial strategies can include
changes in equipment design, proce-
dures, training and organisational poli-
cy.
The analysis provided by the SHERPA
can be summarised into a table showing
the dimensions of likelihood and criti-
cality (Figure 3). This summary pro-
vides the organisation with an overview
of the safety of its working practices,
which can be used as a baseline with
which to compare. In addition, groups of
activities may be compared to see the
extent to which some working practices
are inherently more risky than others.
The critical-high likelihood category
would be given priority when developing
remedial strategies.
Whilst SHERPA analyses the robustness
of activities of people, it says nothing of
their attitudes to effectiveness and safe-
ty. For this reason, we have developed
the ESQ (Effectiveness and Safety Ques-
tionnaire). The ESQ taps into individual
perceptions of the organisation’s effec-
tiveness and attitude to safety. The ESQ
distinguishes among 12 main areas:
• Safety priorities (the commitment of
people to safety);
• Communication (degree of openness
of communication channels);
• Training (the relevance and effective-
ness of training);
• Environment (level of physical com-
fort);
• Individual (people roles in safety and
production);
• Procedures (effectiveness of rules and
procedures);
• Design of work (planning of tasks and
balance of work load);
• Design of equipment (appropriateness
of equipment and ease of use);
• Management (effectiveness and re-
sponsiveness of middle and upper man-
agement);
• Investigation (effectiveness of current
audit systems);
• Emergencies (practicability and prac-
tice of emergency scenarios);
• Maintenance (maintenance planning
and availability).
This provides a comprehensive analysis
of the organisation’s status (Figure 4).
The ESQ summary shows the employ-
ees’ view of the organisation’s perform-
ance. This analysis provides a barome-
ter to the health of the organisation, but
more diagnostic information lies in the
subscales (i.e., scales under the 12 ar-
eas) and analysis of the information by
department and job level within the or-
ganisation. This information can be par-
ticularly useful in trouble shooting par-
ticular problems (such as communica-
tion problems between departments)
and identifying subcultures within the
organisation.
P R E D I C T I N G  T H E  F U T U R E
Whilst some scoff at the idea that the fu-
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Ratings: 1 (poor) to 7 (good)
Safety
Communication
Training
Environment
Individual
Procedures
Design W/P
Design T/E
Management
Investigation
Emergencies
Maintenance
 Effectiveness and Safety Factors
0
1
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5
6
Figure 4: Effectiveness and Safety Questionnaire
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 Figure 3: Error potential in drilling
Likelihood of occurrence
Number of potential errors
Non-criticalCritical
ture can be predicted, others suggest
that making some calculation about rel-
ative alternative possibilities allows the
organisation to choose between alterna-
tive courses of action. As STEPP, HTA,
SHERPA, and the ESQ offer a statement
of the present, it is also possible to use
these methods to present views of the fu-
ture. HTA requires that appropriate
changes are made to the task structure
to reflect how working practices will
look after the changes. The goal hierar-
chy is quite useful in this respect, as they
may not change very much despite dra-
matic changes in tasks. For example, dif-
ferent personnel might take over duties,
mechanisation might remove some
tasks, and new equipment might intro-
duce new tasks. Alternative task struc-
tures could reflect the alternative
strategies that an organisation might
wish to investigate. This information
could be assessed in terms of the error
potential of the new working practices
using SHERPA. The SHERPA analyses
could be compared to see which solution
is the most robust and if any areas need
to be further resolved. A SHERPA analy-
sis of the current situation offers a se-
ries of remedial strategies to make the
work system more effective. In the pre-
dictive mode, a new analysis could an-
ticipate the effects that these changes
would have on the new working prac-
tices. The ESQ make it easy to compare
system safety under a variety of
regimes. The ESQ enables organisations
to focus on those areas that come below
par. Whilst it is true to say that improve-
ments in all areas is desirable, most gain
is likely to come from addressing the ar-
eas of greatest concern. It is acknowl-
edged that peoples perceptions are
much slower to change compared to
working practices, because people need
time to accept and adjust to the new cul-
ture. In previous studies we have noted
changes occurring over 3 years and feel
that this is quite realistic. Finally, the
STEPP analysis allows an organisation
to revisit an incident and test whether it
could recur with the new working prac-
tices, reduction in error potential and
changes in culture. If the organisation
has been successful, the answer should
be negative.
The approach presented would make
the organisation well placed to imple-
ment change. The HTA would enable
them to develop appropriate person
specification and training programmes,
so that they could ensure that the right
people had been selected and they were
trained to the appropriate standard. The
SHERPA would help in producing the
safety case, together with the relevant
engineering information. ESQ provides
a focus for determining which aspects of
the organisational culture need to be ad-
dressed, so planned changes can occur.
Finally, STEPP should provide some re-
assurance that the changes have led to a
better system of working.
W H A T  N E X T ?
At the beginning of this article we  how
effective your organisation was in terms
of assessing its working practices and
making predictions about change. Given
the information that you are now armed
with, we suggest that you are in a posi-
tion to answer those questions. We have
emphasised effectiveness and safety
throughout. The 2 concepts go hand in
hand. Scrutiny along the lines we have
laid out will optimise both, and ensure
that the organisation has more control
over its destiny, rather than inadver-
tently following a path without knowing
what  options are available. n
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Randy Davis, Aberdeen Drilling Schools
SINCE 1997, ABERDEEN Drilling
Schools have been conducting ad-
vanced well control training. The pro-
gram was originally developed in coop-
eration with British Petroleum to en-
hance the understanding and in-depth
awareness of senior supervisors and
managers.
The mold was broken on traditional
well-control training. With the theory of
enrollment through engagement and in-
teractive exchange, the days were split
to achieve 2 objectives.
First, the theory of abstract and techni-
cally challenging well control is under-
taken in an open discussion classroom
atmosphere. Led, encouraged and stim-
ulated by a resident PhD nuclear
chemist, the class contributes equally
by bringing their varied experiences to
a peer assistance and lessons learned
environment. The classroom sessions,
due to the intensity of subject matter
and technical exercises, were limited to
the mornings only.
The second session provided a hands-on
practical session to realistically simu-
late field conditions. This was achieved
with an in-house, full-size drill-floor
simulator. The value added by the small
class size (limited to 6) is in allowing all
to have equal opportunity and experi-
ence in the different roles and responsi-
bilities during a well control situation.
Equally beneficial to the learning
process was the ability to re-create and
replay situations that did not always
have the desired outcome, in order to
achieve the necessary results. The sim-
ulator sessions were designed to give
realistic, relevant, scenarios to which
people could relate and if necessary uti-
lize in the field. The focus of the week
being off- bottom kicks, a number of sce-
narios are developed to examine the
benefits of certain well-control meth-
ods. The various possibilities with ei-
ther a subsea stack or surface stack are
examined throughout the week. In com-
bination with the variety of equipment,
various technical challenges are added
to really stretch even the most experi-
enced personnel. With current industry
trends toward horizontal and deepwa-
ter drilling, it was obvious to elevate the
learning curve towards these high pro-
file risks to give depth to practical
knowledge as well as to operational risk
assessment procedures. The aim was to
not only benefit the practical address of
well-control situations but equally to en-
able the planning process with a more
robust process.
The results of the first 2 years have
shown a much stronger commitment
and equally a different procedure for
achieving such an important industry
goal. On the learning front, the testimo-
nials are numerous as to the benefits of
advanced technical training focused at
learning and not at passing a job re-
quired exam. The added value to drilling
operations will be better well planning
and a more integral approach to well-
control situations.
A B O U T  T H E  A U T H O R
Randy Davis is Senior Drilling In-
structor at Aberdeen Drilling
Schools. n
Trainers Corner
Advanced well control curriculum
breaks mold on traditional training
